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EDITOR’S NOTE
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is assumed to have had at
least three significant and lasting consequences. First, it brought to a
close the most horrid of the bloodletting between the two great camps
of Western Christianity—the Catholic and Protestant faithful. Second,
the Treaty underscored the rise of the nation-state, which was marked
by the supersession of procedures of political rule over ecclesiastical
authority. Third, the primacy of the nation-state, in turn, opened up
nationalist fervor and fierce competition for glory to such an extent
that international transactions were considered to be at the mercy of a
chaotic and dangerous political environment. In time, the latter, in an
appropriation of a particular rendition of Nicolo Machiavelli’s propositions in The Prince, crystallized into a dominant paradigm that popularly came to be known as “Realism.”1 The fundamental postulate of
realism was, and still is, this: Given the absence of a supreme sovereign
and, therefore, the lawless nature of the world, a nation-state should
premise its approach on seeing all alliances as soft and held together
by a temporary convergence of interests. As a result, a nation-state that
aspires not only to survive but to flourish in such an unreliable, if not
deadly, context ought to marshal its military, economic, political, and
other resources and bring that strength to bear as situations demand.
Not surprisingly, the acceleration of the competitive drive among
the nation-states immediately ignited a frenzied debate about war and
peace that continues in our day. In an age closer to our own than the
ancient or medieval periods, and with the clamor over national interests rising to an aggressive crescendo, two voices articulated different
perspectives that are equally at home in contemporary discussions
over the nature of international affairs. In what has become a famous
and classical intervention, Immanuel Kant made the case for the imperatives of cosmopolitan belonging or a universal community:
The alien…may request the right to be a permanent visitor (and it would
require a special charitable agreement to make him/her a fellow inhabitant for a certain period), but the right to visit, to associate, belongs to
all humans by virtue of their common ownership of the earth’s surface;
for since the earth is a globe, they cannot scatter indefinitely, but must,
finally, tolerate living in close proximity.2
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Kant’s cosmic call was counterposed by another German thinker,
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Stressing the unavoidability of realpolitik, he
proffered that the primary aim was “to unite the politics of international power and internal dictatorship, after the world is conquered by
a single sovereign, the only means of ensuring peace.”3 That those differing interpretations and axiologies were not limited to isolated individual thinkers is abundantly testified by the numerous wars between
nation-states, the rise and fall of modern empires, decolonization, and
the various attempts to structure the affairs of the world through the
cultivation of supra-subjectivities and their correlate institutions. In
addition to attempts at the level of regions, examples of the latter
efforts include the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization. Currently, these older concerns are complicated by the end of
the Cold War and the onset of the latest versions of globalization.4
The birth of the United States of America, its evolution, rise to global
power, and contemporary dominance of the world stage are at once
intertwined with the history of the rest of the world and the renderings that accompany each phase. For instance, in its inception, some
deemed the United States as the antithesis of both a Europe, simultaneously burdened with repressive local structures and habits and endless
quarrels that often ushered in destructive wars, and other, more alien,
zones shrouded in “primitive” cultures. Subsequently, the American
Declaration of Independence and constitutionalism were thrust forth
and sanctified as unparalleled achievements to be emulated by a society ambitious enough to cross into the millennium of beckoning freedom and economic prosperity. More specifically, deep-shadowing of
its brutal domestic contradictions notwithstanding,5 this sense of the
American collective identity was increasingly wedded to a religious
(particularly Protestant) conviction—one that stipulated that the rest
of the world ought to be awakened to this newly found path to modernization. Here lies the origin of a complex fusion of what becomes,
in Anatole Lienen’s apt term, the “American Thesis.” At the heart of
this belief is, on the one hand, a preference to keep America’s distance
from the contagions of the afflicted and, on the other, a contradictory
propensity to want to turn others into a replica of self.
American culture historically has embodied a strong strain of isolationism. This isolationism is, however, a complex phenomenon which should
not be understood simply as a desire to withdraw from the world. Rather,
American isolationism forms another face of both American chauvinism
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and American Messianism, in the form of a belief in America as a unique
city on a hill. As a result, it is closely related to nationalist unilateralism
in international affairs, since it forms part of a view that if the United
States really has no choice at all but to involve itself with disgusting
and inferior foreigners, it must absolutely control the process and must
under no circumstances subject itself to foreign control or even advice.6

An assumed triumph of America’s values over the “alternative” that
had culminated in the conclusion of the Cold War reinforced national
self-righteousness, with overconfidence in the country’s “unique” place
in the design of the future. Then the shocking events of September 11,
2001, took place. The immediate impact on the consciousness of the
American people and policymakers was, to say the least, so startling
that a new and contumacious debate started.7 On one side were those
who had articulated a grim vision of the post-Cold War time—one,
they say, in which an unmistakable Manichean line has been drawn
that separates a virtuous United States from a demonic Islamic terrorist network, with supporting states hateful of individual liberty, market
economy, and technological progress.8 Reviving the “American Creed,”
these commentators and their policy-making cohorts within the Bush
Administration set the basis for the quick production of the National
Security Strategy of 2002.9 As the discourse revolved around how best
the United States might engage the rest of the world, this perspective
stressed the necessity of beefing up and subsequently using American
strength. “In deploying American power,” urges Max Boot, “decision
makers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble.”10 Furthermore, this advocacy for the bold use of overwhelming might simultaneously made the case for an unquestionable rectitude of American
hegemony over the rest of the world. Put differently, it is said that an
empire of the American type was a much needed antidote in the face
of an ascending and violent disorder.11 Naturally, such a drumbeating
for unilateralism generated at least two, though somewhat different,
dissenting voices.12 One belongs to those who, while supportive of
American supremacy in world affairs, advocate a multilateral strategy
that still leaves plenty of room for the defense of the national interest.
Joseph Nye conceptualizes this tack as a result of an intelligent mix of
“hard” and “soft” power.13 By far the most formidable reaction to the
unilateralist and imperialist sentiments comes in two guises. The first
is an epistemological-cum-ethical challenge to those whose writings
propagate new imperial interventions, particularly in the global South,
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as positive acts to assuage threatening turbulence. Such convulsions
are often ascribed to the harrowing conditions caused by bust up states
and the liabilities inherent in those societies. In an incisive response to
Michael Ignatieff’s dismissal of the horrid legacies of earlier imperialism so as to create legitimacy for the new versions, Rahul Rao asserts:
When Western academics express impatience at imputations of historical
responsibility for colonialism, they in effect arbitrarily impose a statute
of limitations on discussion of old empire, even as others in the academy…open new chapters in this evolving story. The convergence of this
whitewashing of old imperialism, limitations of its moral responsibility
and advocacy of new imperialism has fueled a profoundly disturbing
renewal of enthusiasm for empire in the Western academy today.14

The other response emanates from the combined contributions of a
cluster of scholars.15 They point to the folly of empire, America’s more
than 725 overseas military bases and other kinds of power notwithstanding. Here, an emphasis is put upon what is taken to be a deep
corrosion of domestic civil liberties and economic well-being, alienation of traditional allies, and insecurities that inevitably accompany
the hijacking and perversion of other peoples’ histories as well as the
consequent frustration of their aspirations in the more transparent age
of technological globalization.
In the end, as American hyperpower plays itself out in the world
arena and in intimate encounters with other societies, all buffeted by
the gale winds of the epoch, the debate over the United States’ role
would only intensify in the coming years. At the core of that conversation is the nature of the relationship between the United States (and, to
a lesser extent, the European Union in-progress) with the vast universe
of the global South. This singling out of the United States is appropriate, given the fact that it will be at the center of global power for a
significant part of this new century. To construct a mutually enabling
dialogue and concrete interactions seems, at first blush and seductively, as relatively simple as a matter of mere communication. Alas, it
is more daunting to such an extent that one could identify the challenge
as the most difficult of all the tasks that confront the current human
civilization. Seen in its full scope and ramifications returns us, then, to
the clairvoyance of Kant. A contemporary version of that universalist
imperative has been cogently expressed by Susan Buck-Morss:

xiv

Editor’s Note

In the global sphere, tolerance is the first criteria; we cannot be placed
on the defensive because of who we are. Freedom to dissent is the second; we need to be able to criticize power that is inhuman in its effects,
regardless of those who exercise it. The third criterion defines the goal
to trust each other politically and act together, even when the languages
in which we speak our moral concerns not only differ, but seem to be in
open contradiction… . What is needed is to rethink the entire project of
politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere—and do
this democratically, as people who speak different political languages,
but whose goals are nonetheless the same: global peace, economic justice, legal equality, democratic participation, individual freedom, mutual
respect.16

With these most crucial issues at stake, a blunt but respectful discussion of America’s interaction with the world, and from variable perspectives, seems an appropriate place to begin.

*****
We start the Roundtable with the opening essay by Niall Ferguson.
His thrust confirms the United States as a global empire indispensable
for an age in need of order, “the necessary precondition for liberty.”
However, he argues, this will not be easy because a successful imperial
leadership requires competent management of the resources at home
and intelligent understanding of the world.
The second session is set around Tariq Ali’s fierce challenge to both
the arguments put forth by Ferguson and what he sees as arrogant
and aggressive but untenable foreign policies of the United States.
Anna Kläppe agrees with much of Ali’s perspective but chides him
for underselling the necessity of creating effective multilateral organizations—including strengthening the United Nations. Mark Davis is
appreciative of Ali’s capacity to historicize America’s current policies
and concurs with Ali’s characterization of U.S. foreign policy-making
as often ill conceived and myopic. Nonetheless, Davis asks for more
judicious and new ideas that could bring relief to those societies caught
up in the grip of “failing states” or brutal dictatorships.
The third conversation is organized around Michael Ledeen’s essay.
His meditations reaffirm the school of thought that has seen the U.S.A.
as a totally “different kind of country.” He asserts that the struggle
against terror is a new phenomenon imposed on the United States
with the events of September 11, 2001. In that context, he bluntly calls
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for a “regime challenge” across the Middle East, with the exception of
Israel, and particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Jesse Uggla agrees with the point that the United States has some
unique characteristics. Moreover, he is sympathetic to the argument
that American leadership has “mismanaged” the response to terrorism. But Uggla contests the wisdom of using American military force
and, instead, advocates an imaginative use of “soft power.” Emily
Rosenberg’s bold intervention takes Ledeen to task on multiple and
critical points. From interpretation of the history of American foreign
relations to Ledeen’s recommended policy towards Iran, Rosenberg
offers a powerful counter-narrative as well as sounds the alarm over
the menace of “imperial hubris.”

*****
The upcoming twelfth annual Macalester International Roundtable
partakes of the 400th Anniversary of the appearance of Don Quixote.
The theme will be “Quixotic Offspring: The Global Legacy of Don
Quixote.”
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